Pinecrest

Round 1

Berkeley prep Brad Stone And Malvika Menon (neg) VS. pine crest JG

# 1NC

# Framework

**The affirmative’s vision of debate obliterates every part of your life outside debate**

Harris, 13

Scott Harris, debate genius; “Scott Harris NDT Final Round Ballot,” 4/5/2013, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.msg10246#new //bghs-ms

For me the negative under develops the extent to which a forced choice that excludes the affirmative approach in every debate is essential. I think the negative should have developed more of a traditional limits type argument. The argument that allowing this affirmative to make the debate about their social location would enable every debate to be framed about a different social location and that there would be a tremendous incentive for fewer and fewer debates to talk about the topic. That the permutation is a bad idea because in the world of the permutation there would be a vested interest in more and more debates crowding out the political debates. In other words, I think the link to the loss of traditional political research and debate from embracing the affirmatives approach in some debates is not developed enough by the negative. The 2NR does say that under the affirmative vision there would be no limits to what the affirmative talks about but the focus is on how that impacts on the ability of the negative to prepare for debates rather than making it about an argument of what debate would look like in the world of the permutation. The negative could also have argued for the importance of Quare individuals specifically to discuss questions of politics and energy policy in particular or answered more specifically the affirmatives assertions that government policy had no relevance to them. The affirmative Quare specificity arguments are late breaking in the debate since they only appear in CX and in rebuttals but the negative does not really address them explicitly. Had these arguments for why the permutation was a bad idea been developed more I would most likely have voted negative in this debate. I am sure that Northwestern’s reaction to this explanation will be to feel “that is what we said.” While I think it is the implicit intent behind their arguments I do not believe that these arguments as a response to the perm are explored sufficiently in the 2NR. I believe that the permutation absorbs most of the negatives offense for why policy debates will be good and then some debates that encourage performative resistance will also be good. I think the negative wins that the framework argument itself is not violent and that voting negative to exclude the aff would not be an act of violence. That does not mean, however, that there is not an inclusion advantage to voting affirmative.

**Harris continues…**

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says this community doesn’t care whether its participants have a life or do well in school or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.

**A limited topic of discussion is key to inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills – even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from being debatable – this still allows innovation, but avoids statements of fact**

Steinberg**,** lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

**The discussion of specific policy questions is key to skill development – we control uniqueness – university students already have preconceived ideological notions of the way the world operates – governmental policy discussions is key to force engagement with competing perspectives**

Esberg & Sagan 12 \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Argumentative exclusion is inevitable, but the implicit exclusion resulting from their framework is on balance worse than the explicit exclusion of the dialectic model – reinscribes social hegemonies in five ways:

* **Creates decision-making inertia**
* **Ignores structural solutions**
* **Masks relational hierarchies**
* **Creates shifting burdens of evidence**
* **Encourages inaction, and**
* **Limits the impact of their advocacy to the debaters themselves**

Tonn, 2005 (Mari Boor Tonn, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 8(3), Project Muse

Among academics, **this cult of conversation has been championed** most ardently **by communitarian political theorists**, civic journalists, cultural feminists, **postmodernists**, multiculturalists, family therapists, **and a number of communication scholars concerned with identity**, the public sphere, conflict and negotiation, and counseling. In many cases, the rationale for a conversational [End Page 405] turn in the ways citizens conduct business, solve problems, and approach conflict is couched in a language interpolating "conversation" or "dialogue" with spirituality and therapy. Particularly visible is Deborah Tannen's 1998 bestseller The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue, wherein she blames a culture of critique for "corroding our spirit."[2](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT2) Likewise, the earlier The Conversation of Journalism proposed supplanting the "disabling" monological approach to news reporting with a more inclusive dialogic paradigm overtly engaging citizens.[3](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT3) So, too, at the University of New Hampshire in the late 1990s, administrators and some faculty proposed replacing the existing Academic Senate, which they termed "dysfunctional," with a nonvoting University Forum aimed to "advance functional conversation" and attendant community.[4](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT4) And the conflation of the conversational and therapeutic for approaching public controversies is made explicit in the Boston Public Conversations Project, premised on "[t]he idea that family therapy skills can be fruitfully applied in the realm of 'public conversations'" on "divisive public issues" such as abortion.[5](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT5) Perhaps the most conspicuous effort at replacing public debate with therapeutic dialogue was President Clinton's Conversation on Race, launched in mid-1997. Controversial from its inception for its ideological bent, the initiative met further widespread criticism for its encounter-group approaches to racial stratification and strife, critiques echoing previously articulated concerns—my own among them[6](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT6) —that certain dangers lurk in employing private or social communication modes for public problem-solving.[7](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT7) Since then, **others have joined in contesting the treating of public problems with narrative and psychological approaches, which**—in the name of promoting civility, cooperation, personal empowerment, and socially constructed or idiosyncratic truths—**actually work to contain dissent, locate systemic social problems solely within individual neurosis, and otherwise fortify hegemony**.[8](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT8) Particularly noteworthy is Michael Schudson's challenge to the utopian equating of "conversation" with the "soul of democracy." Schudson points to pivotal differences in the goals and architecture of conversational and democratic deliberative processes. To him, political (or democratic) conversation is a contradiction in terms. **Political deliberation entails a clear instrumental purpose**, ideally remaining ever mindful of its implications beyond an individual case. **Marked by disagreement**—even pain—**democratic deliberation contains transparent prescribed procedures governing participation and decision making so as to protect the timid or otherwise weak**. In such processes, written records chronicle the interactional journey toward resolution, and in the case of writing law especially, provide accessible justification for decisions rendered. In sharp contrast, conversation is often "small talk" exchanged among family, friends, or candidates for intimacy, unbridled by set agendas, and prone to egocentric rather than altruistic goals. Subject only to unstated [End Page 406] "rules" such as turn-taking and politeness, conversation tends to advantage the gregarious or articulate over the shy or slight of tongue.[9](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT9) The events of 9/11, the onset of war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and the subsequent failure to locate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction have resuscitated some faith in debate, argument, warrant, and facts as crucial to the public sphere. Still, the romance with public conversation persists. As examples among communication scholars, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's 2001 Carroll C. Arnold Distinguished Lecture treated what she termed "the rhetoric of conversation" as a means to "manage controversy" and empower non-dominant voices[10](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT10) ; multiple essays in a 2002 special issue of Rhetoric & Public Affairs on deliberative democracy couch a deliberative democratic ideal in dialogic terms[11](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT11) ; and the 2005 Southern States Communication Convention featured family therapist Sallyann Roth, founding member and trainer of the Public Conversations Project, as keynote speaker.[12](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT12) Representative of the dialogic turn in deliberative democracy scholarship is Gerard A. Hauser and Chantal Benoit-Barne's critique of the traditional procedural, reasoning model of public problem solving: "A deliberative model of democracy . . . constru[es] democracy in terms of participation in the ongoing conversation about how we shall act and interact—our political relations" and "Civil society redirects our attention to the language of social dialogue on which our understanding of political interests and possibility rests."[13](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT13) And on the political front, British Prime Minister Tony Blair—facing declining poll numbers and mounting criticism of his indifference to public opinion on issues ranging from the Iraq war to steep tuition hike proposals—launched The Big Conversation on November 28, 2003. Trumpeted as "as way of enriching the Labour Party's policy making process by listening to the British public about their priorities," the initiative includes an interactive government website and community meetings ostensibly designed to solicit citizens' voices on public issues.[14](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT14) In their own way, each treatment of public conversation positions it as a democratic good, a mode that heals divisions and carves out spaces wherein ordinary voices can be heard. In certain ways, Schudson's initial reluctance to dismiss public conversation echoes my own early reservations, given the ideals of egalitarianism, empowerment, and mutual respect conversational advocates champion. Still, in the spirit of the dialectic ostensibly underlying dialogic premises, this essay argues that various negative consequences can result from transporting conversational and therapeutic paradigms into public problem solving. In what follows, I extend Schudson's critique of a conversational model for democracy in two ways: First, whereas Schudson primarily offers a theoretical analysis, I interrogate public conversation as a praxis in a variety of venues, illustrating how public **"conversation" and "dialogue" have been coopted to silence rather than empower marginalized or dissenting voices**. In practice, public conversation easily can emulate what feminist political scientist Jo Freeman termed "the tyranny of structurelessness" in her classic 1970 critique of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement,[15](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT15) as well as the key traits Irving L. Janis ascribes to "groupthink."[16](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT16) Thus, contrary to its promotion as a means to neutralize hierarchy and exclusion in the public sphere, public conversation can and has accomplished the reverse. When such moves are rendered transparent, public conversation and dialogue, I contend, risk increasing rather than diminishing political cynicism and alienation. Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model for democracy may mute an individual's voice in crafting a resolution on a given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and othersto consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects.[17](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT17) First, **because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure**. As Freeman aptly notes, although "[u]nstructured groups may be very effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren't very good for getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire of 'just talking.'"[18](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT18) Second, **because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems**. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of "healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment" tends to "encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration."[19](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT19) Social Conversation, Therapy, and Public Deliberation The allure of conversation or dialogue to remedy corrosive political alienation and disaffection undoubtedly lies in social talk as a primary site for locating a sense of self, creating and performing social identity, and developing and sustaining relationships.[20](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT20) On its face, conversation appears less threatening than traditional modes of public deliberation in several respects. First, conventional conceptions of expertise are significantly refigured in social conversations. In social settings, evidence often consists of lived experiences, hearsay, anecdotes, and personal feelings and opinions rather than, for example, statistics or studied conclusions from authorities. Moreover, because social conversations frequently [End Page 408]engage with the trivial, quotidian, or entertaining, persons with social or cultural knowledge and interpersonal skills—the talent, say, to tell a joke, discuss sports, or narrate travails of childbearing and rearing—may find themselves prized in a conversational arena. Indeed, conversational "expertise" often is equated with the gift for eliciting and validating personal experiences and opinions of others, even in the face of disagreement. Additionally, whereas informal rules of conversation are familiar and accessible to most individuals, formal processes common to public deliberation may intimidate the uninitiated in parliamentary procedure. Although conversations are not without norms, such talk unfolds spontaneously through informal, unstated conventions of politeness linked to turn-taking; topic initiation, acceptance, and refusal; leave-taking; and so forth. Participants who violate conventions by interrupting, monopolizing talk, or even voicing racism or sexism, for example, seldom face the type of reprimand often encountered in formal deliberations. In a related vein, then, the priority placed on forging and maintaining relationships in social conversations privileges avoiding conflict, even when conversational partners violate norms or make outlandish claims. Because the presumption of trust governs, Ronald Wardbaugh notes, "good behavior in conversations is cooperative behavior" and confrontation becomes anathema: challenging or "correcting others . . . directly questions an underlying assumption of conversation—that everybody is telling the truth."[21](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT21) If friction threatens or erupts, parties skirt conflict through capitulation or compromise, silence, shifting topics, or polite physical escape.[22](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT22) Even some argumentation scholars agree that eluding discord trumps effective decision making when talk is "conversational." Thomas A. Hollihan and Kevin T. Baaske, for example, counsel conversationalists to consider, "How might [a dispute] affect our relationship?" and "What good is securing a victory in an argument, if the person [I] have argued with . . . refuses to be a friend, or comes to . . . dislike [me]?"[23](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT23) Therapeutic dialogue is likewise highly personal, although such talk directly engages with some conflict or struggle: addiction, familial strife, grief, eating disorders, low self-esteem, or other personal or relational issues. Therapeutic discourse—be it in encounter groups, 12-step programs, or individual counseling—travels a course of self-discovery aimed ultimately at personal, not social, reform. In therapeutic talk, the self monopolizes; the individual is central subject, provider of evidence, and solution, even if the "problem" entails external structures such as work-related stress or navigating racism, sexism, or homophobia.[24](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT24) Ironically, although the postmodern turn in therapy challenges the concept of an isolated self by emphasizing identity and knowledge as products of relational dialogue,[25](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT25) some postmodern dialogic therapists nonetheless regard external data that might contradict a client's self-reports [End Page 409] as not germane. Sheila McNamee, for example, terms as "monologic" rather than her preferred "dialogic" the "modernist belief that we can objectively assess a person, a situation, or a relationship based on the notion that there are (or could be) some clear standards for evaluation. . . . .The discourse of reason is so commonplace" that "[w]e simply expect others to be able to provide rational and objective evidence supporting their claims."[26](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT26) To be sure, certain conventional boundaries between public and private forms of communication and problem solving are artificial; deliberation over facts, values, and courses of action inhere in essentially all human decision making, whether it be over foreign policy or navigating daily life. So, too, some rhetorical scholars, myself included, have noted that some rhetors may mobilize oppressed or politically disaffected constituencies by transferring certain communication skills acquired in the private sphere into the public domain, especially if the rhetor's aims entail transforming disempowered audiences into confident and skilled political actors.[27](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT27) In fact, Campbell's treatment of the "rhetoric of conversation" in the talk of three historical female figures greatly mirrors the consciousness-raising that she earlier analyzed in the women's liberation movement.[28](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT28) Still, in important respects, received conceptions of democracy and public deliberation stand in sharp relief to social conversations and therapeutic dialogues. First, unlike the scrupulous avoidance of conflict in social conversations, democratic argument, as Kenneth Burke contends, is necessarily an admixture of "competition" and "cooperation." As he argues, "Only if all reports were in and if there were no vital questions still unanswered, could a social body dispense with the assistance of a vocal opposition in the maturing of our chart as to what is going on, which social functions are helpful and which are harmful."[29](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT29) Thus, contrary to the relational harmony privileged in social conversations, true civic deliberation fully recognizes, in Schudson's words, that "Democracy is deeply uncomfortable."[30](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT30) Public arguments are catalyzed by predicament or dispute, placing them at odds with the social convention prescribing divisive issues such as politics and religion as off-limits in "polite conversation." Rather than developing relationships of equality, the conversational privileging of affective criteria over reasonable problem solving in public deliberations can invite, as I have said, what Janis terms "groupthink." Among the primary contributors to groupthink, explains Janis, is the goal of group cohesiveness. To maintain the god-term of "community," self-appointed group mindguards paint dissenters as disloyal or uncooperative, limit future membership to like-minded individuals, and frame out-group opposition as too evil, ignorant, or unintelligent to warrant consideration. Similar to social conversations, in groupthink, parties concerned about appearing unduly [End Page 410] quarrelsome avoid conflict by denying or diluting their reservations about a proposed action, shifting or tabling discussion of thorny topics, or resorting to silence or physical absence. Such self-censorship, coupled with the faulty assumption that silence equals consent, results in the illusion of unanimity.[31](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT31) Although name-calling and ostracism can and do occur in traditional democratic processes, the prioritizing of group harmony and cohesiveness in conversational models grants freer license to scapegoat. Second, **democratic processes and public problem solving necessarily diverge from social conversations by articulating objectives at the outset; adhering to formal rules for participating in, managing, and achieving problem resolution; and documenting outcomes**. Through the scrupulous recording of motions, discussions, amendments, and votes, the dynamics of such joint action are rendered visible, accessible, and retrievable, even to persons not party to the immediate deliberative process. "Democracies," Schudson writes, "put great store in the power of writing to secure, verify, and make public. Democracies require public memories."[32](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT32) Thus, **contrary to the framing of conversation and dialogue as egalitarian public problem-solving models, they, in truth, can reify pecking orders by licensing group members with social authority to set agendas, steer and dominate discussion**, and—absent the polling and recording of votes—interpret the "will" of the group. Moreover, **such informal processes can reward those who speak the loudest, the longest, are the most articulate, or even the most recalcitrant**. Freeman's analysis of consciousness-raising groups is instructive: At any small group meeting anyone with a sharp eye and an acute ear can tell who is influencing whom. The members of the friendship group will relate more to each other than to other people. They listen more attentively, and interrupt less; they repeat each other's points and tend to give in amiably; they tend to ignore or grapple with the "outs" whose approval is not necessary for making a decision . . . They are nuances of interaction, not prewritten scripts. But they are discernible, and they do have their effect. Once one knows . . . whose approval is the stamp of acceptance, one knows who is running things.[33](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT33) As a result, Freeman argues that **purportedly "structureless" organizations are a "deceptive . . . smokescreen,"** given that **"'structurelessness' does not prevent the formation of informal structures, but only formal ones** . . . **For everyone to have the opportunity to be involved . . . and to participate . . . the structure must be explicit, not implicit. The rules of decision-making must be open and available to everyone, and this can only happen if they are formalized**."[34](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT34) Schudson likewise argues that the inherently "threatening" nature of political deliberation demands procedures guaranteeing "equal access to the floor, equal participation in setting the ground rules for discussion, and a set of ground rules designed to encourage pertinent speaking, attentive listening, appropriate simplifications, and widely apportioned speaking rights."[35](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT35) Third, whereas in social and therapeutic talk, personal experience, opinion, and individual well-being reign supreme, the force of "opinion" in a democracy demands allegiance both to reasonableness and to the larger collective good. Unlike certain postmodern dialogic therapists, responsible public deliberators view neither facts as inescapably elusive nor appeals to the rational uniformly suspect. Rather, democratic arguers apply rigorous standards for evidence and, above all, writes Schudson, subscribe to "norms of reasonableness."[36](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT36) A key groupthink feature—uncritical, self-righteous faith in the group's inherent morality and traditions—is nourished by privileging lived experiences and personal opinions, the primary content of social and therapeutic talk. As Donal Carbaugh points out, **because the "self" becomes the "locus of conversational life," conversationalists may "disprefer consensual truths, or standards of and for public judgment," which they view to "unduly constrain 'self.'**"[37](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT37) **Such an egocentric focus can enable members of deliberative bodies to discount crucial, formal types of external evidence that counters existing personal and group assumptions**, resulting in what Lisa M. Gring-Pemble characterizes as forming public policies such as welfare reform "by anecdote."[38](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT38) Fourth, **a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression**. As Schudson puts it, "Conversation has no end outside itself."[39](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT39) Similarly, modeling therapeutic **paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy**. As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, "**[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal, and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . . Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only the very limited realm of** therapeutic, **small group interaction**."[40](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT40) Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the "self-help" on which much therapy rests. **A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue** not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, **provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems** such as disproportionate black poverty. **If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction**, as Sheila McNamee claims, **all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves**. Below, various exemplars of public interactions and decision-making processes couched as "conversations" and "dialogues" expose the promotion of these private communication models as balm for the inequities, discord, and inertia of civic life as often more romantic than realistic, what Burke might term an "idealistic lie."[41](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT41) As importantly, such cases illustrate his contention that ostensible "cures" for social problems often "take on the quality of the disease."[42](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT42) Indeed, **rather than remedying exclusion, hierarchy, polarization, and inertia in civic life, the appropriation of conversation and dialogue into the public realm can foster and sustain such problems**.

## K

**Their demand for the ballot in response to descriptions of suffering is an attempt to commodify the other --- their advocacy may sound empathetic but it fails as a political strategy by comforting the Western observer and reinforcing the status quo.**

**Bystrom, 12** - Kerry L. is Assistant Professor of English and Director of the Research Program on Humanitarianism at the Human Rights Institute, University of Connecticut, Storrs, "Spectacular Rhetorics: Human Rights Visions, Recognitions, Feminisms (review)." Human Rights Quarterly 34.4 (2012): 1214-1217. Project MUSE)//A-Berg

\*gender modified

Over the past decade, a growing body of work has brought humanities perspectives to human rights scholarship and challenged still widely-held assumptions that the task of advancing human rights is most fundamentally a matter of law and politics. Texts such as Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith's Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of Recognition (2004), Anne Cubilié's Women Witnessing Terror: Testimony and the Cultural Politics of Human Rights (2005), and Joseph R. Slaughter's Human Rights, Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form and International Law (2007) have inaugurated a lively and expansive discussion about the work of culture and representation in human rights activism, not to mention its centrality in shaping the larger social imaginary within which this activism takes place. Wendy S. Hesford's provocative and important book Spectacular Rhetorics: Human Rights Visions, Recognitions, Feminisms adds further vitality to this discussion, as it shifts attention from the narrative to the visual axis and mounts a compelling argument about the significance of notions and practices of visibility and spectatorship in contemporary human rights work. Hesford poses international human rights as a regime constitutively bound up with practices of vision and discourses of sight; she notes that "[t]he history of human rights can be told as a history of selective and differential visibility, which has positioned certain bodies, populations, and nations as **objects of recognition** and granted others the power and means to look and to confer recognition."1 From this perspective, human rights activism—as it takes place across the "truth-telling genres" she surveys, from photography to documentary film and theater, testimony, and ethnography— becomes a "spectacular rhetoric" **aimed at making** formerly "invisible" **subjects "visible" to the Western** and often specifically American audience of rights holders.2 Moments or "scenes" of this activism participate in and extend what Hesford calls the larger "human rights spectacle," not a single image or set of images but "the incorporation of subjects (individuals, communities, nations) through imaging technologies and discourses of vision and violation into the normative frameworks of a human [End Page 1214] rights internationalism based on United Nations (UN) documents and treaties."3 As Hesford deftly argues, being made visible through this process of incorporation is not all it is cracked up to be, because the human rights spectacle relies on structures of sight that may ultimately **enable human rights abuses to continue** (about which more below). Yet, she also rightly points out, "the human rights spectacle is not fully allied with abusive power" and activists can mine its very paradoxes and complications to open up new ways of seeing.4 How might the human rights spectacle perpetuate—or at the very least not fundamentally alter the structure of—violation? The basic argument to this end is set forth in Chapter One, "Human Rights Visions and Recognitions," a theoretical chapter that explains the "ocular epistemology" or visibility-based system of knowledge through which human rights developed and connects it with what is posed as the central problem of "recognition." Recognition, Hesford argues—and in dialogue with a sometimes-dizzying array of thinkers from the fields of politics, philosophy, literary theory, and performance studies—has been the paradigm through which human rights internationalism recruits and defines human subjects. In the context of human rights, it is tied to spectacular scenes of trauma and suffering, where the subject of human rights discourse becomes visible through ~~her~~ [their] representation as a feminized victim with whom the spectator must sympathize or identify. The problem with this paradigm, Hesford argues, is that it often **re-affirms the self of the Western, neoliberal spectator** rather than enabling true (and materially based) response to the generally non-Western rights claimant. Hesford notes that the rights claimant's coding as "victim" further means that she is [they are] **incorporated into the spectator's self**—and into the framework of human rights—in a manner that constrains ~~her~~ [their] agency and pegs ~~her~~ [them] to a relation of inferiority. Phrased more pointedly, recognition and the attendant incorporation of previously "invisible" subjects by US audiences often perpetuates **hierarchical visions of human rights** bound up with capitalism and concerned mainly with rescuing traumatized women and children from the Global South. Such visions **lionize Western activists** and activism as they re-victimize the "victims" of abuse and obscure the material contexts and transnational interests that allow abuses to occur. By participating in this visual economy, activist scenes, quite contrary to their intentions, can be **complicit in reproducing the status quo** of global power and inequality in which violation is rooted. Lest this sound too abstract, Hesford gives concrete examples in each of the chapters that follow, which present case studies of activism surrounding the War on Terror (Chapter Two: "Staging Terror Spectacles"), rape warfare (Chapter Three: "Witnessing Rape Warfare: Suspending the Spectacle"), global sex work and trafficking in women (Chapter Four: "Global Sex Work, Victim Identities and Cybersexualities") and infringements of children's rights (Chapter Five: "Spectacular Childhoods: Sentimentality and the Politics of (In)visibility"). For instance, in "Staging Terror Spectacles," Hesford shows how the use of the Abu Ghraib photographs in the 2004 International Center for Photography exhibition "Inconvenient [End Page 1215] Evidence," meant to criticize US abuses of human rights in Iraq, intersects with the George W. Bush administration's narrative of the US as a traumatized nation that underwrote the Iraq war.5 "Spectacular Childhoods"—one of the book's most compelling chapters—similarly shows how good intentions go awry through a sensitive and nuanced reading of Ross Kauffman and Zana Briski's Academy Award-winning documentary about children from a red-light district in Calcutta, Born Into Brothels (2004). While careful not to dismiss the positive achievements of the film, Hesford argues that its staging of a version of the recognition paradigm described above—one in which exploited and impoverished children move beyond their trauma by learning to express themselves in art, and in this way claim visibility in the international community—can reinforce counterproductive human rights visions. The film "recreat[es] the spectacle of salvation" through Briski's actions as an activist art teacher in Calcutta and reinforces "Western humanitarianism's investment in transnational sentimentality and capitalist consumption."6 Not only may this perpetuate colonialist stereotypes of the unfit "third world" parent and lead to regressive policies such as child removal, but it also ignores certain effective forms of local activism and obscures many of the intersecting structural conditions that narrow life options for the children featured in the film. Configuring the visibility of these children through the dominant forms of the human rights spectacle, then, according to Hesford, may not be the most helpful way to resolve their problems. This is a strong (albeit justified) critique. As already mentioned, however, Spectacular Rhetorics moves beyond critique to a positive agenda, which helps Hesford's book avoid the trap of a facile or overly zealous rejection of human rights that can characterize certain strands of humanistic inquiry into the field. Throughout the book Hesford traces forms of advocacy that may exploit or unsettle the dominant human rights spectacle and offer modes of responding to the erstwhile "victims" of human rights abuse that reconfigure or work beyond the recognition paradigm. Key to this endeavor are activist scenes that—by doing more than "simply turn[ing] passive or silent voices into compelling speech, or reproduc[ing] the traumatic real" and instead creating scenes that "reconfigur[e] witnessing in rhetorical and ethical terms"—help spectators cultivate an active and complex practice of witnessing.7 This positive project is outlined theoretically in the Introduction and Chapter One, and gains depth and clarity in the case studies. Of particular note is "Witnessing Rape Warfare: Suspending the Spectacle." Here, Hesford examines a series of what she shows to be ethical and potentially useful representations of rape in the former Yugoslavia, including Midge Mackenzie's documentary film The Sky: A Silent Witness (1995) and Melanie Friend's visual and acoustic exhibition Homes and Gardens (1996), as well as Mandy Jacobson and Karmen Jelincic's documentary film Calling the Ghosts: A Story about Rape, War and Women (1996). The first two pieces, [End Page 1216] Hesford argues, "suspend the [human rights] spectacle" by boycotting the image of the rape victim—in the first case, by refusing to show the visual image of a woman giving oral testimony about her rape and posing instead the image of water and the sky, and in the second by juxtaposing another set of oral testimonies with ordinary or intimate images of domestic life in Yugoslavia before the war.8 Hesford shows how the discordance created in these pieces between searing spoken testimony and non-spectacular visual images can help to draw attention to the dangers of identification or recognition, and may prompt in the spectator an awareness of the "crisis of witnessing" that seeing or hearing testimony should prompt—ultimately producing what Hesford, after Dominick LaCapra, calls "empathetic unsettlement."9 This is a move away from recognition through identification to a more nuanced interaction that respects otherness even as it allows for connection. Calling the Ghosts goes even further towards turning spectators into ethical witnesses, Hesford argues, as it foregrounds the status of rape "victims" as survivors and activists; self-consciously stages the dilemmas of representation; troubles the notion that legal recognition is the end-point for the women in question; and calls for ongoing global response. As Hesford puts it, "the differentiated politics of recognition and reflexive witnessing that Calling the Ghosts puts forth may provide a model for the emergence of new transnational publics to offset the nationalist politics of recognition and the spectacular gaze of the international community in the face of wars and other violent conflicts."10 Overall, Spectacular Rhetorics is a timely and resonant book that clearly demonstrates "the rhetorical force that visual media exert in mediating the public's engagement with human rights principles and inscribing human rights internationalism into the texts of global capitalism and its nationalist and militarist correlates."11 Its casting of human rights advocacy as a "spectacular rhetoric" is a move that opens exciting ground for future research. Further, the book is carefully organized such that each case study extends and enriches the theoretical questions advanced in the opening chapters, raising new directions for critical inquiry and presenting both challenges and opportunities for current human rights activists. Spectacular Rhetorics might make for demanding reading for non-humanities scholars, in part because of the tendency to re-route assertions through citations from other scholars and in part because of its reliance on a dense theoretical vocabulary. But the book's potential difficulty also stems from the fact that it makes critiques that can feel quite close to home and provides readers with a thick accretion of ideas that take time to work through and grapple with—and these are surely aspects of scholarship that should be celebrated. Hesford's book deserves this time, thought, and celebration. [End Page 1217]

**This use of the other as a means for a ballot simply reduces populations to utility --- the impact is genocide.**

**Chow, ‘6** - Professor Comparative Lit at Brown, (Rey, “The Age of the World Target” p 40-42)//a-berg

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the "scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the institutional practice that **substantiated** and elaborated **the militaristic conception of the world** as target.52 In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits "I higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the **politics and ideology of war**. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war‚—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes53‚—is it a surprise that it is **doomed to fail** in its avowed attempts to "know" the other cultures? Can "knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign "self"/"eye"‚— the "I"‚—that is the United States, **the other will** have no choice but **remain** just that‚— **a target whose existence justifies** only one thing, its **destruction** by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber‚—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter‚—will never receive the attention that is due to them. "Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences.54 This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object"‚—and by "the problem of the vanishing object."55 As Harootunian goes on to argue, for all its investment in the study of other languages and other cultures, area studies missed the opportunity, so aptly provided by Said's criticism of Oriental ism, to become the site where a genuinely alternative form of knowledge production might have been possible. Although, as Harootunian writes, "Said's book represented an important intellectual challenge to the mission of area studies which, if accepted would have reshaped area studies and freed it from its own reliance on the Cold War and the necessities of the national security state,"56 the challenge was too fundamentally disruptive to the administrative and instrumentalist agendas so firmly routinized in area studies to be accepted by its practitioners. As a result, Said's attempt to link an incipient neocolonial discourse to the history of area studies was almost immediately belittled, dismissed, and ignored, and his critique, for all its relevance to area studies' future orientation, simply "migrated to English studies to transform the study of literature into a full-scale preoccupation with identity and its construction."57

**The alternative is to vote neg --- your role as a judge is to interrogate how we should deal with our privileged positions which allow us to speak in the first place.
Chow, ’93 -** Professor Comparative Lit at Brown, (Rey, “Writing Diaspora” p 15-17 google books)//a-berg

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but **how they can resist**, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against **a hegemony which already includes them** and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, **many** deep-rooted, **politically reactionary forces return** to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested **claims** **of oppression and victimization** that **are used** merely **to guilt-trip and to control**; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises **remain unquestioned**. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are **battles of words**. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly **not** directly **changing the** downtrodden **lives of those who seek** their **survival** in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate **from their** “oppositional” **viewpoint**, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

# Case

#### Political factors outweigh biopolitics as the internal link to genocide.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

This, then, is the transformation created by the Nazis. Here too, just as in the literature on eugenics, it has become clear that it was not so much a rupture at the level of goals or biopolitical discourse, as a rupture at the level of strategy —of political principle, political organization, and political practice. The decisive differences are to be found not so much in biopolitical discourse as in issues of institutional structure, regime form, and citizenship.

Their impacts are empirically denied—the absence of mass murder and genocide in the modern world denies the link to biopolitics.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

What I want to suggest here is that the function of the rhetorical or explanatory framework surrounding our conception of modernity seems to be in danger of being inverted. The investigation of the history of modern biopolitics has enabled new understandings of National Socialism; now we need to take care that our understanding of National Socialism does not thwart a realistic assessment of modern biopolitics. Much of the literature leaves one with the sense that a modern world in which mass murder is not happening is just that: a place where something is not —yet— happening. Normalization is not yet giving way to exclusion, scientific study and classification of populations is not yet giving way to concentration camps and extermination campaigns. Mass murder, in short, is the historical problem; the absence of mass murder is not a problem, it does not need to be investigated or explained.

#### Biopolitics doesn’t lead to eugenics.

Edward Ross **Dickinson, 2004** (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

By the onset of the Great Depression, then, eugenics advocates in Germany appear to have accomplished strikingly little in concrete terms. In fact, if we compare the successes of eugenicists in Germany with those of their counterparts in the United States or the United Kingdom, what is impressive is how vanishingly little practical influence eugenics had in Germany even at the end of the 1920s. As the above summary suggests and as subsequent events would show, at least among a limited number of ministerial bureaucrats and within key nongovernmental organizations eugenics had effectively established itself as a credible science and a credible basis for an alternative — or more accurately a supplementary— policy structure, should the existing biopolitical policy framework (public health, social insurance, social welfare) fail. That was an impressive and historically important achievement; but it hardly makes eugenics the keystone of the broader biopolitical discourse. In fact, it now seems evident that eugenics was still essentially a very small and somewhat isolated part of that discourse.While the institutional framework of social welfare, public health, and social insurance had been under construction for well over half a century by 1930, eugenics was still not really politikfähig — not really a viable basis for actual policies.

#### Biopolitics doesn’t lead to eugenics—they have the history of Germany wrong.

Edward Ross Dickinson, 2004 (University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

We may draw some brief conclusions from this story. First, there clearly was no especially convincing fit between eugenic ideas and totalitarian politics. Second, the Nazis adopted and supported one particular variety of eugenic thought.They were not driven by “the” logic of eugenics; rather, they pursued “a” logic of eugenics. Third, the Nazis imposed this particular variety of eugenics on a biopolitical “establishment”— a complex of institutions, disciplines, practices, and policies —that was not very excited about eugenics of any variety, much less the racist negative eugenics the Nazis favored.

# 2NC

1. The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon – the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters

 Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing – 2000

 <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

1. Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

 American Heritage Dictionary – 2000 [www.dictionary.com]

 3 Used to express probability or expectation

1. The USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

 Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000 [http://encarta.msn.com]

 “The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.”

our role of the ballot is the only predictable one – both in terms of the resolution we all voted for and the consensus of community practices

Timothy M. **O’Donnell**, 200**4**, Director of Debate, University of Mary Washington, PhD at Pittsburgh, “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate,” Blue Helmet Blues: United Nations Peacekeeping and the United States, Ed. Stefan Bauschard & Jean-Paul Lacy, <http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/DRGArtiarticlesIndex.htm>

The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that **interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be**. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is **prior to the start of their conversation**. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens **when participants fail to reach agreement** about what it is that they are arguing about? **They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying**. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, **genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute**. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, **the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock**. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.i How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. **The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community**. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. **Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This** common starting point, or **topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus**.

every role of the ballot excludes all others – changing the fundamental question to be debated justifies any of thousands of philosophical frameworks – and even professional philosophers say this creates an impossible research burden

Nicholas **Rescher**, 200**1**, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Director of the Center for the Philosophy of Science, former president, American Philosophical Association, *Philosophical Reasoning: A Study in the Methodology of Philosophizing*, p.36-37

The concern of philosophers for the subject’s agenda is vividly illustrated by the early twentieth century’s penchant for agenda-reducing positions. Indeed **most of the century’s major movements proposed reducing the agenda to nil**. Logical **positivism set out to eliminate virtually all of traditional philosophy and substitute natural science** in its place. **Analytic philosophers and deconstructionists alike agreed with eliminationism, but opted for different replacements** – the study of **language in the former** case **and** that of **literature in the latter**. **Other schools**, by contrast, were prepared to leave the subject more or less intact but **fought for control of the agenda in ways that prioritized them in particular range of concern**: pragmatists – social concerns, feminists – women’s issues, etc.

However, apart from such doctrine-infused views as to how the agenda of philosophy *ought* to be constituted there stands the doctrine-external issue of how the business of the subject *is in fact* being pursued by the wider community of philosophical writers at large. What is at issue here is not the philosophically doctrinal perspective of “what constitutes proper philosophizing” but a descriptively bibliographic perspective regarding what philosophers are actually doing. It is, accordingly, not evaluatively normative but a factually descriptive issue that belongs in the hands of the students of philosophy rather than in those of the philosophers themselves.

When we look at the issue of agenda formation from this descriptive point of view, **what most strikingly comes to view is the fact of agenda explosion** – an enlargement that has engendered a revolutionizing of the structure of philosophy itself by way of taxonomic complexification. It is clear, for example, that the current (1990s) picture of the taxonomic lay of the land in North American philosophy is thus vastly more complex and ramified than anything that has preceded it. The taxonomy of the subject has burst for good and all the bounds of the ancient tripartite scheme of logic, metaphysics, and ethics. Specialization and division of labor runs rampant, and cottage industries are the order of the day. **The situation has grown so complex and diversified that the most comprehensive recent** English-language **encyclopedia of philosophy** (Edwards 1967) **cautiously abstains from providing any taxonomy of philosophy whatsoever**. (this phenomenon also goes a long way towards explaining why no one has written a comprehensive history of philosophy that carries through to the present-day scene.2) **Philosophy** – which ought by mission and tradition to afford an integration of knowledge – **has** itself **become increasingly complex to the point of disintegration**.

we control the uniqueness on education – debates in which there is no agreed-upon methodology to evaluate competing advocacies create irresolveable decision calculi, forcing judge intervention – this trumps any other scenario for loss of education and proves a reason to prefer our objective criteria for evaluating debates

Paul A. **Sabatier, and** Hank C. **Jenkins-Smith**, 19**93**, “The Dynamics of Policy-Oriented Learning,” *Policy Change and Learning*, p.52-55, googlebook

Analytical Tractability **Policy analysis**, like science, is a social activity. It **is grounded in the process of finding agreement among practitioners regarding what count as valid bases for claims regarding policy-relevant facts and values** (Brecht, 1959:114). Although the process in policy analysis is necessarily more tentative, less precise, and more eclectic than is true of the natural sciences (Landau, 1977; MacRae, 1975). policy analysts have nonetheless developed a substantial body of concepts, methods, and guidelines— many of them derived from welfare economics—that constitute broadly accepted means to analyze policy issues and provide advice (‘Neiss, 1972; Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1979; Nachmias, 1979; Jenkins-Smith, 1990). Within given policy subfields, analysts typically come to recognize and employ common sources of data, concepts, and theories regarding the subject at hand (Kingdon, 19S4:84). **These commonalities provibe assessed with respect to a common standard. Also of importance is the existence of an agreed-upon value or goal with which to compare options**.

#### This understanding of politics is key to spur compassion

Porter, head of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, 2006 [Elisabeth, "Can politics practice compassion?" Hypatia Sep, p project muse]

As individuals, we have responsibilities beyond our personal connections to assist whenever it is within our capacities and resources to do so. I do not want to give the impression that our entire lives should be devoted to attending to others' needs. To do so would return women to exclusive nurturance at the expense of self-development and public citizenship. It is, rather, a matter of acting with compassion when it [End Page 108] is possible to do so, and the possibility of course is debatable and requires priorities, which differ with us all. Politically, this means that politicians, nations, and international organizations have a similar responsibility to alleviate the suffering that results when peoples' basic needs are not met. There is a heavy responsibility on wealthy nations where the extent of poverty and misery is not as conspicuous as elsewhere to assist less wealthy nations.16 State responsibility is acute when suffering is caused by harsh economic policies, careless sales of arms and military weapons, severe immigration rules, and obscene responses to terrorism by further acts of violence. With the majority of these massive global issues, most of us can only demonstrate the first stage of co-suffering, and perhaps move to the second and debate the merit of options that might meet peoples' needs, and alleviate suffering. This vocal civic debate can provoke the third process of political responses that actually lead to political compassion. Given nations' moral failures of compassion and such conspicuous evidence of oppression, exploitation, brutality, and indifference, we need to be observant, and understand the implications of a failure to practice compassion.

#### Agonism encourages creativity and cooperation – turns the aff

Acampora 2

(Acampora, Christa Davis, philosophy professor at Hunter College of CUNY, Fall of 2002, “Of Dangerous Games and Dastardly Deeds”, International Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 34, No. 3)

If we can revive the sense of agon as a gathering together that vivifies the sense of competition that initiates a striving together toward, we can better appreciate the unique relational possibilities of competition. Recalling the definitions of agon and competition provided above, from which I tried to indicate a sense of competition that could facilitate a process of gathering to strive together toward, consider another example. When two runners compete in order to bring out the best performances in each, their own performances become inextricably linked. When I run with you, I push you to pull me, I leap ahead and call you to join me. When you run faster, I respond to your advance not by wishing you would run slower or that you might fall so that I could surge ahead. I do not view your success as a personal affront, rather I respond to it as a call to join you in the pursuit. When in the course of running with me, you draw from me the best of which I am capable, our performances serve as the measure of the strength in both of us. Neither achievement finds its meaning outside of the context in which we created it. When two (or more) compete in order to inspire each other, to strive together toward, the gathering they create, their agon, creates a space in which the meaning of their achievements are gathered. When your excellent performance draws mine out of me, together we potentially unlock the possibilities in each. For this we can certainly be deeply indebted to each other. At the same time, we come to understand and appreciate ourselves and our own possibilities in a new way. Furthermore, this way of coming to understand and appreciate our difference(s), and of recognizing perhaps their interdependence, might be preferable, to other ways in which differences might be determined. Although surely not appropriate in all circumstances, agonistic endeavors can provide an arena for devising a more flexible and creative way of measuring excellence than by comparison with some rigid and externally-imposed rule. xxviii Agonism is not the only productive way of relating to each other, and we can certainly play in ways that are not agonistic, but I do think such an ethos of agonism is compatible with recognition of both the vulnerability of the other and one's dependence upon others for one's own identity. It incorporates aggression, instructive resistance, as well as cooperation, and it is compatible with the practice of generosity. It cultivates senses of yearning and desire that do not necessarily have destructive ends. It requires us to conceive of liberation as something more than freedom from the constraints of others and the community, but as a kind of freedom— buttressed with active support—to be a participant in the definition and perpetual recreation of the values, beliefs, and practices of the communities of which one is a part. That participation might entail provisional restraints, limitations, and norms that mark out the arenas in which such recreations occur. At his best, I think Nietzsche envisions a similar form for the agonistic life. Competitive "striving together toward" can be a difficult condition to create and a fragile one to maintain. It requires the creation of a common ground from which participants can interact. It needs a clearly defined goal that is appropriately demanding of those who participate. It requires that the goal and the acceptable means of achieving it are cooperatively defined and clearly articulated, and yet it must allow for creativity within those rules. It demands systematic support to cultivate future participants. And it must have some kind of mechanism for keeping the competition open so that future play can be anticipated. When any one of the required elements is disrupted, the competition can deteriorate into alternative and non-productive modes of competition and destructive forms of striving. But when agonistic contest is realized, it creates enormous opportunities for creative self-expression, for the formation of individual and communal identity, for acquiring self-esteem and mutual admiration, and for achieving individual as well as corporate goals. It is one of the possibilities that lie not only beyond good and evil but also beyond the cowardly and barbarous.

# 1NR

**Aff locks-in an investment in the oppression of the Other.**

**Chow 93** (Rey Chow, Professor of English 0061nd Comparative Literature, and Director of the Comparative Literature Program at the University of California, Writing Diaspora: tactics of intervention in contemporary cultural studies, pp 12-15, http://www.jonvonkowallis.com/readers/CHIN2400/475-493-Rey\_Chow-Tactlcs\_of\_Intervention\_in\_Contemporary\_Cultural\_Studies.pdf)//A- berg

\*gender modified

In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Maoist is disillusioned to watch the China they sanctified crumble before their eyes. This Is the period in which we hear disapproving criticisms of contemporary Chinese people for liking Western pop music and consumer culture, or for being overly interested in sex. In a way that makes her indistinguishable from what at first seems a political enemy, the Orientalist, the Maoist now mourns the loss of her loved object— Socialist China—by pointing angrily at living third world’ natives. For many who have built their careers on the vision of Socialist China, the grief is tremendous. in the ‘cultural studies’ of the American academy in the 1990s, the Maoist Is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as “oppression” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used. Contrary to Or1enta11t disdain for contemporary native cultures of the non-West, the Maoist turns precisely the “disdained” other **into the object** of his/her study and, in some cases, Identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralism, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West. “‘ Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (I.) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those In the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, It produces a way of talking In which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization, and so forth are **drawn upon indiscriminately**, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American Intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world Intellectual,” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock In order to authenticate his Identity as a radical “third world” representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-subalternizatlon, which has Increasingly become the assured means to **authority and power**. What these Intellectuals are doing is **robbing the terms of oppression** of their critical and oppositional Import, and thus **depriving the oppressed of** even the vocabulary of **protest** and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose vo1es we seldom hear, are robbed twice—the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is now no longer distinguishable from those of us who have had our consciousnesses raised. In their analysis of the relation between violence and representation, Armstrong and Tennenhouse write: “[The] idea of violence as representation is not an easy one for most academics to accept. It Implies that whenever we speak for someone else **we are inscribing** ~~her~~ [**them**] **with our own** (implicity masculine) **idea of order**.” At pre sent, this process of “inscribing” often means not only that we represent” certain historic others because they are/were “oppressed”; It often means that there Is interest In representation only when what is represented can in some way be seen as lacking. Even though the Maoist is usually contemptuous of Freudian psychoanalysis because it Is “bourgeois,” her investment in oppression and victimization fully partakes of the Freudian and Lacanian notions of “lack.” By attributing lack,” the Maoist Justifies the “speaking for someone else” that Armstrong and Tennenhouse call violence as representation.” As in the case of Orientalism, which does not necessarily belong only to those who are white, the Maoist does not have to be racially “white” either. The phrase “white guilt” refers to a type of discourse which continues to position power and lack against each other, while the narrator of that discourse, like Jane Eyre, speaks with power but identifies with powerlessness. This Is how even those who come from privilege more often than not speak from/of/as its lack.” What the Maoist demonstrates is a circuit of productivity that draws its capital from others’ deprivation while refusing to acknowledge its own presence as endowed. With the material origins of her own discourse always concealed, the Maoist thus speaks as if her charges were a form of immaculate conception. The difficulty facing us, It seems to me, Is no longer simply the “first world” Orientalist who mourns the rusting away of his treasures, but also **students from privileged backgrounds** Western and non-Western, who conform behaviorally in every respect with the elitism of their social origins (e.g., through powerful matrimonial alliances, through pursuit of fame, or through a contemptuous arrogance toward fellow students) but who nonetheless proclaim dedication to “vindicating the subalterns.” My point is not that they should be blamed for the accident of their birth, nor that they can not marry rich, pursue fame, or even be arrogant. Rather, it is that they choose to see in others’ powerlessness an **idealized image** of themselves and refuse to hear in the dissonance between the content and manner of their speech their own complicity with violence. Even though these descendents of the Maoist may be quick to point out the exploitativeness of Benjamin Disraeli’s ‘The East is a career,” they remain blind to their own exploitativeness as they make ‘the East” their career. How do we Intervene in the productivity of this overdetermined circuit?

**To the aff the other is simply an object of research, distancing and excluding them from an active role in empowerment**

**Pearce 08 -** (Jenny, International Centre for Participation Studies/Department of Peace Studies at University of Bradford, “We Make Progress Because We are Lost: Critical Reflections on Co Producing Knowledge as a Methodology for Researching Non governmental Public Action” http://www.docstoc.com/docs/158531648/Microsoft-Word---NCRM-EPrints-Repository)

The idea of co-producing knowledge ‘with the researched’ emerges from a family of methodologies which attempt to ‘generate knowledge about a social system while at the same time, attempting to change it’ (Lewin, 1945, quoted in Drummond and Themessl-Huber, 2007) ); which claim: ‘it is right and possible for poor and marginalized people to conduct their own analysis and take action’ (Chambers,1997:107) or which have built on feminist theory to show ‘the highly problematic nature of the representation of research (Whose voices? Whose perspectives? Whose theories?) (Schrijvers, 1997:21); which is experiential and where ‘the subjects of the research contribute not only to the content of the research ie. the activity that is being researched, but also to the creative thinking that generates, manages, and draws conclusions from, the research’ (Heron,1981: 153) and which is based on a ‘participatory worldview’ rather than a positivist distinction between science and everyday life, where ‘the validity of our encounter with experience rests on the high quality, critical, self-aware, discriminating and informed judgments of the co-researchers ‘(Reason, 1994:11) These methodologies share a challenge to the premise of positivism that truth is only found through standing outside the object of knowledge. The methodologies posit that truth, as far as it is possible to make claims to it, springs from the quality of the relationships built with the ‘researched’ i.e. from deeper engagement with rather than distance from the ‘object’ of knowledge. They also challenge methodologies which have sought to get closer to the lived reality of the researched, such as anthropological ‘participant observation’, but which do not aim to give the ‘observed’ a role in the research process. Wright and Nelson argue that participatory research is in fact the opposite of participatory observation: ‘The principle of participatory research is that people become agents rather than objects of research and the priorities of this approach are opposite to participant observation. The first aim is for the research to increase participants’ understanding of their situation and their ability to use this information, in conjunction with their local knowledge of the viability of different political strategies, to generate change for themselves. A very secondary aim is to contribute to disciplinary knowledge with its double edge of both advancing our understanding of hierarchies and power, and of contributing to world-ordering knowledge’ (Wright and Nelson, 1995:51)

## Cards from 1nc